"FREE SPEECH" AND "ALL MEN ARE FALLIBLE"
QUOTES FROM RICHARD ROBINSON AN ATHEIST’S VALUES ON THE STATE AND
POLITICS AND EQUALITY
Richard Robinson, An Atheist's Values, 1964.
Robinson writes, “It is not a good reason for free speech to remark that 'people
cannot help what they believe'. They can help publishing what they believe, for
they can keep their thoughts to themselves. But, further, they can help what
they believe to a large extent; for they can choose whether or not to seek and
listen to evidence and argument on both sides of the question, whether or not to
try to judge equably on the basis of all available evidence and argument,
whether to be reasonable, in short. And their choice in this matter will largely
determine what they believe. There are two great and good reasons for free
speech. One of them is simply that freedom is a great good, and any suppression
of freedom is consequently an evil. And this is a very great and strong reason
though it is short to say. The other strong reason for free speech is that the
toleration of free speech is far more likely to produce a general spread of true
opinion than is the suppression of it; and truth and the general spread of truth
are very great goods.”
'All men are fallible' … is not selfrefuting in the obvious sense of
selfcontradictory.
But there is another kind of selfrefutation besides selfcontradiction. If a man
opens his mouth and says 'I am not speaking now', he makes a selfconsistent but
false statement. The peculiarity of it is that the fact, to which one appeals to
show that the statement is false, is the utterance of the statement itself.
Precisely by uttering the statement he produces the state of affairs in virtue
of which the statement is false. (Similarly, if a man says 'I am speaking now',
he makes his statement true by uttering it.)
The statement that 'all men are fallible' is not selfrefuting in this way
either, for you do not by uttering it produce an infallible man. (It would be
remarkably convenient if you could make yourself infallible by declaring that
'all men are fallible'.)
These are the only two ways in which a statement can refute itself, so far as I
can see. Either it contradicts itself, or by its utterance it provides a
negative instance which disproves itself. Since 'all men are fallible' does
neither of these, it is not selfrefuting.
In addition to selfrefutation there is perhaps such a thing as
selfstultification. The statement that 'what I say is never worth saying'
neither contradicts nor otherwise refutes itself; but it appears to stultify
itself. A statement stultifies itself, we may define, if it entails that to
assert it would be silly.
The statement that 'all men are fallible' does not stultify itself. On the
contrary, if it is true it is very important, and a wise man will assert it from
time to time.
I fear that, in spite of these explanations, the uneasy feeling may remain with
some of you that the statement that 'all men are fallible' does after all
somehow do away with itself. If that is so, I ask you to write down at your
leisure exactly how it does this, and then to look for a flaw in what you have
written. I think you will probably find a flaw; but, if you do not, bring it to
me and I will try to find a flaw in it.
I will give now two examples of finding a flaw in such attempts. People
sometimes say that 'those who argue against infallible authority claim
infallibility for themselves'. The flaw here is that this is simply false. We do
not claim infallibility for ourselves. Every man who utters a statement thereby
implicitly claims that that statement is true. But he does not thereby claim
that all the statements he ever utters are true. That is, he does not claim that
he is infallible. Whenever a man makes a sincere statement he thinks it true;
but no sensible man has ever thought that all the statements he had ever uttered
or would ever utter were true. The statement that 'all men are fallible' is the
same in this respect as the statement that 'all men are mortal'. The speaker of
either of them claims to be telling a truth but does not claim to be infallible.
Every statement equally claims truth for itself, and every statement equally
refrains from claiming that its utterer is infallible.
This is a mistake that has been made by the assailants of infallibility as well
as by its defenders. Mill wrote that 'all silencing of discussion is an
assumption of infallibility' (op. cit., p. 79, Everyman). This, I regret to have
to admit, is false. To silence a discussion is not to assume that one is
infallible. The editor who declares that 'this correspondence must now cease',
the chairman who forbids the raising of a certain topic, the headmaster who
forbids the boys to debate birthcontrol, are none of them assuming themselves
infallible. They are merely assuming themselves to be right in thinking that
they ought to silence this particular discussion now. Silencing a discussion is
an act of government. Are we to say that all acts of government assume the
infallibility of the governor, or that only this special kind of act of
government assumes the infallibility of the governor? Both are obviously false,
but Mill's sentence implies that one of them is true. However, it is only Mill's
expression that is wrong here. What he had in mind was the truth that only a
belief in his own infallibility could morally justify a governor in permanently
forbidding adult persons to express a certain view (cf. p. 85). But he failed to
say clearly that it is a matter of moral justification, not of logical
assumption.
Here is a second example of finding a flaw in an attempt to show that the
doctrine that all men are fallible disposes of itself. People sometimes think
that the proposition that 'we are fallible' entails its own contradictory in the
following way: 'Assume that we are fallible; it follows that we may be wrong in
saying that we are fallible; and from this in turn it follows that we are
infallible.'
The flaw here is that it is false that the second consequence follows. From 'we
may be wrong in saying that we are fallible' it does not follow that 'we are
infallible'. 'Are' never follows from 'may be'. From possibilities alone one
cannot rightly conclude to facts. We may call this fallacy the illicit process
from possibility to actuality.
Attempts to increase the virtue and intelligence of the citizens by censorship,
or by legal penalties for moral crimes as such, or by religious laws, have the
opposite result.
Religious faith being not a virtue but a vice, the State should not try to
encourage it.